**DONOTDELETE**
05-12-2002, 06:37 PM
http://www.jbs.org/vietnam/no_win/hal_moore.htm
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Lt. General Harold G. Moore (Ret.) graduated from West Point in 1945, commanded two infantry companies in the Korean War, was a battalion and brigade commander in Vietnam, and later commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Korea. A master parachutist and Army aviator, he helped develop and launch the concept of the Air Cavalry in Vietnam. General Moore co-authored with Joe Galloway the best-seller, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young (now a major motion picture), the dramatic and moving account of the 7th Cavalry’s epic action in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, one of the Vietnam War’s bloodiest battles. He was interviewed by William F. Jasper, senior editor of THE NEW AMERICAN.
TNA: First of all, General Moore, allow me to compliment you on a stunning and stirring achievement; your book provides an unflinching look at the horrors and heroism of war, a moving tribute to those who gave their all. Plus, it offers insights and revelations concerning the political decisions that caused our debacle in Vietnam, something that is desperately needed to counter the liberal-left revisionism that has dominated all media and academic commentary on the Vietnam War for more than three decades. It is one of the best I’ve read.
Moore: Thank you.
TNA: I understand that you were a consultant to the film. Did you go on location for the actual filming?
Moore: Actually my wife and I visited the sets at Fort Benning, Georgia, three or four times. And then we visited Fort Hunter Liggett in California, where the Ia Drang battles were recreated, twice, for three or four days each time. We probably viewed maybe a total of 4 or 5 percent of the total viewing. We were not there to be the boss or to offer running critiques. I was a consultant, which means that whenever they asked a question of me I answered it to the best of my ability. If I saw something that was grossly wrong, I would respectfully inform the director. Otherwise, I didn’t look over his shoulder; nobody was looking over my shoulder during the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TNA: You recount the bitter anger and frustration that you and others in the military felt concerning the decisions in Washington to allow the Communist forces to have safe sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia from which to attack your positions and the gag orders that were placed on you not to mention these policies to the press or the public. As a result, much of the American public didn’t know — and still doesn’t know — that these sanctuaries were a fact and played a crucial role in the war’s final outcome.
Moore: Well, those sanctuaries sure as hell were there. The fact is that Johnson would not let us follow the defeated enemy to his death or surrender in Cambodia; so he was allowed to regroup, reinforce, resupply, and redeploy. The fact is that we officers were forbidden to tell a reporter that, yes, we were fighting North Vietnamese, which we did anyhow, because it was the truth. The fact is that the enemy had sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, southern North Vietnam and northern South Vietnam. And by handing him these sanctuaries, Lyndon Johnson handed the enemy the tactical and strategic initiative. They could come out of those safe areas at their time and pleasure, take us on, and then go back into those sanctuaries to take care of their wounded, regroup, and get re-equipped. We were denied the tactical and strategic initiative by Lyndon Johnson. The lies and deception of the Johnson administration were so morally wrong, and the enormity of it all is just finally coming out.
TNA: A revealing account that you describe in the book concerns a briefing by your operations officer at LZ X-Ray, Matt Dillon, which you attended with General Westmoreland. When Captain Dillon mentioned that among the enemy dead they had found the body of what appeared to be a Red Chinese officer, Westmoreland blew up and insisted: "You will never mention anything about Chinese soldiers in Vietnam again!"
Moore: If you go to the library and pull up the New York Times for November 17, 1965, you will find on the front page a piece by Charles Mohr, in which he describes a briefing in Saigon where an American briefing officer told the press that one of these Chinese advisors had been captured in South Vietnam in this Pleiku campaign of 1965, and I believe they brought out a North Vietnamese prisoner of war who admitted that in front of the news media. And it’s my suspicion that what happened after the article came out in the Times is that the White House sent what we call a "back channel" message to Westmoreland in Saigon telling him very sternly never to trot out any Chinese or mention their involvement. Johnson repeatedly said "we want no wider war." Remember that? So this enraged him.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TNA: In your book, you record many instances of the North Vietnamese going through the battlefield executing the American wounded. From what I’ve read and from the many veterans I’ve interviewed, this was fairly standard practice by both the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army throughout the war. Was that their doctrine?
Moore: I questioned Generals Giap and An about that. They denied it; insisted it wasn’t their doctrine. I don’t know. I don’t know how universal it was; I do know that it happened in the Ia Drang. It’s easy for someone who’s never been in the hell of battle, sitting comfortably and safely in an easy chair, to be very critical of the actions of soldiers in the field who have just been through a horrendous meat-grinding experience with their buddies being shot and blown to pieces. You don’t know how you’re going to react until you’ve been there. I know that I never killed any prisoners or wounded.
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<BLOCKQUOTE><font size="1" face="Verdana, Helvetica, sans-serif">quote:</font><HR>
Lt. General Harold G. Moore (Ret.) graduated from West Point in 1945, commanded two infantry companies in the Korean War, was a battalion and brigade commander in Vietnam, and later commanded the 7th Infantry Division in Korea. A master parachutist and Army aviator, he helped develop and launch the concept of the Air Cavalry in Vietnam. General Moore co-authored with Joe Galloway the best-seller, We Were Soldiers Once … and Young (now a major motion picture), the dramatic and moving account of the 7th Cavalry’s epic action in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, one of the Vietnam War’s bloodiest battles. He was interviewed by William F. Jasper, senior editor of THE NEW AMERICAN.
TNA: First of all, General Moore, allow me to compliment you on a stunning and stirring achievement; your book provides an unflinching look at the horrors and heroism of war, a moving tribute to those who gave their all. Plus, it offers insights and revelations concerning the political decisions that caused our debacle in Vietnam, something that is desperately needed to counter the liberal-left revisionism that has dominated all media and academic commentary on the Vietnam War for more than three decades. It is one of the best I’ve read.
Moore: Thank you.
TNA: I understand that you were a consultant to the film. Did you go on location for the actual filming?
Moore: Actually my wife and I visited the sets at Fort Benning, Georgia, three or four times. And then we visited Fort Hunter Liggett in California, where the Ia Drang battles were recreated, twice, for three or four days each time. We probably viewed maybe a total of 4 or 5 percent of the total viewing. We were not there to be the boss or to offer running critiques. I was a consultant, which means that whenever they asked a question of me I answered it to the best of my ability. If I saw something that was grossly wrong, I would respectfully inform the director. Otherwise, I didn’t look over his shoulder; nobody was looking over my shoulder during the fighting in the Ia Drang Valley.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TNA: You recount the bitter anger and frustration that you and others in the military felt concerning the decisions in Washington to allow the Communist forces to have safe sanctuaries in Laos and Cambodia from which to attack your positions and the gag orders that were placed on you not to mention these policies to the press or the public. As a result, much of the American public didn’t know — and still doesn’t know — that these sanctuaries were a fact and played a crucial role in the war’s final outcome.
Moore: Well, those sanctuaries sure as hell were there. The fact is that Johnson would not let us follow the defeated enemy to his death or surrender in Cambodia; so he was allowed to regroup, reinforce, resupply, and redeploy. The fact is that we officers were forbidden to tell a reporter that, yes, we were fighting North Vietnamese, which we did anyhow, because it was the truth. The fact is that the enemy had sanctuaries in Laos, Cambodia, southern North Vietnam and northern South Vietnam. And by handing him these sanctuaries, Lyndon Johnson handed the enemy the tactical and strategic initiative. They could come out of those safe areas at their time and pleasure, take us on, and then go back into those sanctuaries to take care of their wounded, regroup, and get re-equipped. We were denied the tactical and strategic initiative by Lyndon Johnson. The lies and deception of the Johnson administration were so morally wrong, and the enormity of it all is just finally coming out.
TNA: A revealing account that you describe in the book concerns a briefing by your operations officer at LZ X-Ray, Matt Dillon, which you attended with General Westmoreland. When Captain Dillon mentioned that among the enemy dead they had found the body of what appeared to be a Red Chinese officer, Westmoreland blew up and insisted: "You will never mention anything about Chinese soldiers in Vietnam again!"
Moore: If you go to the library and pull up the New York Times for November 17, 1965, you will find on the front page a piece by Charles Mohr, in which he describes a briefing in Saigon where an American briefing officer told the press that one of these Chinese advisors had been captured in South Vietnam in this Pleiku campaign of 1965, and I believe they brought out a North Vietnamese prisoner of war who admitted that in front of the news media. And it’s my suspicion that what happened after the article came out in the Times is that the White House sent what we call a "back channel" message to Westmoreland in Saigon telling him very sternly never to trot out any Chinese or mention their involvement. Johnson repeatedly said "we want no wider war." Remember that? So this enraged him.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TNA: In your book, you record many instances of the North Vietnamese going through the battlefield executing the American wounded. From what I’ve read and from the many veterans I’ve interviewed, this was fairly standard practice by both the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army throughout the war. Was that their doctrine?
Moore: I questioned Generals Giap and An about that. They denied it; insisted it wasn’t their doctrine. I don’t know. I don’t know how universal it was; I do know that it happened in the Ia Drang. It’s easy for someone who’s never been in the hell of battle, sitting comfortably and safely in an easy chair, to be very critical of the actions of soldiers in the field who have just been through a horrendous meat-grinding experience with their buddies being shot and blown to pieces. You don’t know how you’re going to react until you’ve been there. I know that I never killed any prisoners or wounded.
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